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“ ‘Ought’ and ‘Must’— they are contemptible auxiliaries.”
George Eliot†
Abstract
This paper develops an account of the meaning of ‘ought’, and the distinction be-
tween weak necessity modals (‘ought’, ‘should’) and strong necessity modals (‘must’,
‘have to’). I argue that there is nothing specially “strong” about strong necessity modals
per se: uses of ‘Must φ’ predicate the (deontic/epistemic/etc.) necessity of the prejacent
φ of the actual world (evaluation world). The apparent “weakness” of weak necessity
modals derives from their bracketing whether the necessity of the prejacent is verified
in the actual world. ‘Oughtφ’ can be acceptedwithout needing to settle that the relevant
considerations (norms, expectations, etc.) that actually apply verify the necessity of φ.
I call the basic account a modal-past approach to the weak/strong necessity modal dis-
tinction (for reasons that become evident). Several ways of implementing the approach
in the formal semantics/pragmatics are critically examined. The account systematizes
a wide range of linguistic phenomena: it generalizes across flavors of modality; it eluci-
dates a special role that weak necessity modals play in discourse and planning; it cap-
tures contrasting logical, expressive, and illocutionary properties of weak and strong
necessity modals; and it sheds light on how a notion of ‘ought’ is often expressed in
other languages. These phenomena have resisted systematic explanation. In closing I
briefly consider how linguistic inquiry into differences among necessity modals may
improve theorizing on broader philosophical issues.
*Thanks especially to Eric Swanson for extensive discussion and comments on earlier drafts. Thanks toBilly
Dunaway for feedback on reining in the bloated beast that was the penultimate draft. Thanks also to Matthew
Chrisman, Brendan Dill, Jan Dowell, Allan Gibbard, Irene Heim, Ezra Keshet, Dan Lassiter, David Plunkett,
Paul Portner, Bernhard Salow, Robert Shanklin, Bob Stalnaker, and audiences at SALT 22, MIT, Northwestern,
and USC. Preliminary versions of the paper were published in Silk 2012 and 2013d: ch. 2. My 2016b drew on
material from earlier drafts. Portions of §7 are drawn from Silk 2015b.
†Mary Garth, inMiddlemarch, Bk. 2, Ch. 14. Shamelessly modified from the original.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 ‘Ought’ and ‘must’ in context 4
3 The analysis: Preliminary 7
4 Weak necessity and the modal past 12
4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2 Implementations: A modal-past approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3 Entailments? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 “Weakness” in weak necessity modals 21
5.1 Diagnosing weakness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2 Entailingness and directive force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3 Qualification: Endorsing and non-endorsing use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6 Negotiability and collective commitment 28
7 Conclusion 32
7.1 Counterfactuality? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.2 Philosophical therapy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
References 38
1 Introduction
A notion of ‘ought’ is central in many areas of philosophical discourse. “A primitive ought,”
Gibbard tells us, “is the basic conceptual atom that gives normative concepts their special
character” (2006: 738). Yet, historically speaking, surprisingly little attention has been paid
among philosophers to the distinctive features of the meaning and use of ‘ought’. ‘Ought’
is often treated as relevantly equivalent to a range of expressions of obligation and necessity.
The eponymofGibbard’s Professorial Chair, RichardBrandt, observed asmuch half a century
ago: “Philosophers often use the following expressions as approximate equivalents: ‘It is X’s
duty to do A’; ‘It is obligatory for X to do A’; ‘It would be wrong for X not to do A’; and ‘X
ought to do A’ ” (1964: 374). Here, more recently, is Åqvist:
[D]eontic logic… is the logical study of the normative use of language and…
its subject matter is a variety of normative concepts, notably those of obligation
(prescription), prohibition (forbiddance), permission and commitment. The first
one among these concepts is often expressed by such words as ‘shall’, ‘ought’ and
‘must’, the second by ‘shall not’, ‘ought not’ and ‘must not’… (Åqvist 2002: 148)
There has been extensive work in descriptive linguistics on discourse differences among
Åqvist’s “normative-concept-expressing” words. For instance, it’s common to distinguish
categories of so-called “weak” necessity modals such as ‘ought’ (‘should’, ‘be supposed to’)
and “strong” necessitymodals such as ‘must’ (‘have to’, ‘(have) got to’, ‘be required to’).1 Hold-
ing the reading of the modals fixed, (1a) is consistent in a way that (1b) is not. ‘Ought φ’ can
be followed by ‘Must φ’, but not vice versa:
(1) a. I should help the poor, but I don’t have to.
b. #I must help the poor, but it’s not as if I should.
(2) a. I ought to help the poor. In fact, I must.
b. I must help the poor. #In fact, I ought to.
There are also conversational differences. Informally:
To say that one ought to take a certain option is merely to provide a nudge in
that direction. Its typical uses are to offer guidance, a word to the wise…, to
recommend, advise… In contrast, to say that one must take a certain option
1See, a.m.o., Sloman 1970, Leech 1971, Horn 1972, Wertheimer 1972, Harman 1975, Lyons 1977,
Woisetschlaeger 1977,Williams 1981, Coates 1983, Jones&Pörn1986,McNamara1990, Palmer 1990,
2001, Bybee et al. 1994, Myhill 1995, Myhill & Smith 1995, Huddleston & Pullum 2002, von Fintel
& Iatridou 2008, Rubinstein 2012; additional references to theoretical accounts in due course. I focus on
modal verbs; see Van Linden 2012 on weak vs. strong modal adjectives.
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is to be quite forceful. Its typical uses are to command, decree, enact, exhort,
entreat, require, regulate, legislate, delegate, or warn. (McNamara 1990: 156)
Gibbard hedges his bets on what natural language expression best approximates his fa-
vored normative notion:
Ewing’s point is not that the English word ‘ought’ exactly captures the notion
he has in mind. The word often suggests merely the weight of one set of con-
siderations among others… The word ‘must’ might be better for his purposes
and mine [!?!?!], but it has its own flaws: it suggests greater urgency than Ew-
ing’s ought would have when factors in a decision nearly balance out. (Gibbard
2012: 14–15; more on ‘!?!?!’ later)
An interesting question for a paper—not this one (cf. Silk 2015b2)— is towhat extent insen-
sitivity to linguistic differences among ‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘must’, ‘have to’, etc. may be a source
of philosophical malaise. On the flip side, perhaps investigating the meaning and discourse
function of such words can help clarify the contours of Gibbard’s basic normative “concep-
tual atom” and improve philosophical theorizing. In this paper I wish to set the stage for such
a project by attending to the matters narrowly linguistic: what ‘ought’— the eponymous ex-
pression of Gibbard’s “primitive concept ought” (2012: 204)— itself means. I focus on the
distinction in “strength” between ‘ought’— and its weak-necessity-modal kin—and strong
necessity modals such as ‘must’.
Although there has been growing interest in the semantics of ‘ought’, accounts are often
developed in ways which bracket differences among necessity modals. Formal accounts of
theweak/strong necessitymodal distinction are typically developed piecemealwith an eye to-
ward a narrow range of data. Adjudicating among theories can be difficult, if not premature.
The aim of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive theoretical investigation into
weak and strong necessity modals. Building on previous work (Silk 2012, 2013d) I develop
an account of the meaning of ‘ought’ and the distinction between weak and strong necessity
modals. The account systematizes a wide range of semantic and pragmatic phenomena: it
generalizes across flavors of modality; it elucidates a special role that weak necessity modals
play in discourse and planning; it captures contrasting logical, expressive, and illocutionary
properties of weak and strong necessity modals; and it sheds light on how a notion of ‘ought’
is expressed in other languages. These phenomena have resisted systematic explanation.
Roadmap: §2 presents core data illustrating the effects of standing contextual assump-
tions on the relative felicity of weak vs. strong necessity modals. The §2-examples highlight
what I regard as the fundamental difference between the class of weak necessity modals and
the class of strong necessity modals.
2Here and throughout: For shame.
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§3 presents the basic account of the weak/strong necessitymodal distinction. No innova-
tions are introduced in the semantics/pragmatics of strong necessity modals; uses of ‘Must φ’
predicate the (deontic/epistemic) necessity of the prejacentφ of the actual world.3 Theappar-
ent “weakness” of weak necessity modals derives from their bracketing whether the necessity
of the prejacent is verified in the actual world. ‘Ought φ’ can be accepted without accepting
that φ is necessary (deontically, epistemically, etc.). Weak necessity modals afford a means
of entertaining and planning for hypothetical extensions of the context in which certain con-
siderations (norms, values, etc.) apply, without needing to commit that the considerations
aren’t actually defeated.
§4 examines how weak necessity is expressed cross-linguistically to motivate several for-
mal implementations of the informal §3-account. For reasons that will become clear, I call
the family of analyses amodal-past approach to ‘ought’ and the weak/strong necessity modal
distinction. I argue that the proposed treatment of the cross-linguistic data improves on the
treatment in von Fintel & Iatridou 2008. The account gives precise expression to the
informal idea that ‘ought’ is weaker than ‘must’, and captures ways in which ‘ought’, unlike
‘must’, patterns with past-marked modal forms.
§5 applies the formal semantics from §4 to several puzzles of entailingness and performa-
tivity with ‘ought’ and ‘must’. Examining these puzzles highlights a second dimension along
which modals differ, regarding their tendencies to be used in (what I call) an “endorsing” vs.
“non-endorsing” way.
§6 recaps distinctive features of the account, before contrasting it with one prominent
alternative in greater detail: the “collective commitment” analysis in Rubinstein 2012.
§7 concludes and raises directions for future research. Potential implications of the lin-
guistic work on modals for broader philosophical theorizing are briefly considered.
For familiarity I follow the literature in labelling modals such as ‘ought’ and ‘should’
as “weak necessity” modals, and labelling modals such as ‘must’, ‘have to’, ‘(have) got to’
as “strong necessity” modals. The terminology of “weak necessity” and “strong necessity”
shouldn’t mislead. I am not assuming that uses of the modals in the ‘ought’-family invariably
convey a weaker felt conversational force, that the modals express different “kinds” of neces-
sity, or even that they comprise a scale of logical/quantificational strength. A claim such as
that strong necessity modals truth-conditionally entail weak necessity modals, which truth-
conditionally entail possibility modals constitutes a substantive empirical hypothesis on my
terminology. We will see reasons for questioning each of the above claims. (Hereafter I typ-
ically use ‘ought’ as my representative of the ‘ought’/‘should’/etc. family, and ‘must’ as my
representative of the ‘must’/‘have to’/etc. family.)
3I treat ‘φ’, ‘ψ’, etc. as schematic letters to be replaced with declarative sentences. For convenience I some-
times refer to the possible-worlds proposition expressed by ‘φ’ by dropping the single quotes, e.g. using ‘φ is
necessary’ for ‘JφKc is necessary’, where JφKc = {w ∶ JφKc,w = 1}; I slide between equivalent set-/function-talk.
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2 ‘Ought’ and ‘must’ in context
Descriptive and theoretical research onmodals highlights various conversational differences
among necessity modals. This section focuses on one such difference, concerning the effects
of contextual assumptions on the relative felicity of weak vs. strong necessity modals.4
A central purpose of conversation is to share and coordinate our expectations, values,
and plans. Sometimes we assert propositions outright. We commit to settling on their truth
for the remainder of the conversation. But sometimes we don’t wish to impose such a strong
restriction on the future course of the conversation. Wemaywant to propose that someone is
obligated to do something but be unsure about whether theremight be competing norms that
could outweigh or cancel her obligation. Or we may want to proceed as if some proposition
is true while remaining open to the possibility that our apparent evidence for it is misleading.
I suggest that the role of weak necessity modals is to afford ameans of making such proposals
and expressing such states of mind.
Start with an epistemic case. Suppose we’re working on an art project and I ask youwhere
the colored pencils are. Normally you put them in the drawerwith the crayons but sometimes
you accidentally put them on the shelf. In this scenario it’s more appropriate for you to use
‘ought’ in responding to my question:
(3) Me: Do you know where the colored pencils are?
You: They ought to (/should/?must/?have to) be in the drawer with the crayons.
Suppose, alternatively, that we’re looking for the colored pencils together, and you saw some-
thing that leads you to conclude that they are in the drawer. Perhaps you noticed that they
weren’t on the shelf, and this is the only other place you think they could be. In this scenario
it’s more natural for you to use ‘must’:
(4) Me: Do you know where the colored pencils are?
You: They must (/have to/?ought to/?should) be in the drawer with the crayons.
4SeeWoisetschlaeger 1977: ch. 5 andMcNamara1990: ch. 3 for prescient early discussion of contextual
differences between ‘ought’ and ‘must’. For extensive discussions in descriptive linguistics, see the references in
nn. 1, 35, 39. See Rubinstein 2012 and Silk 2012 for recent theoretical emphasis. Rubinstein doesn’t consider
epistemic examples; I examine her alternative take on the data in §6.
For reasons discussed in §§5–6, it’s important not to substitute other strong necessity modals (e.g. ‘have to’)
for ‘must’ in examples unless indicated otherwise; speakers who find ‘should’ more natural than ‘ought’ may
substitute ‘should’ for ‘ought’ throughout. Judgments concerning some of the examples may be vague for some
speakers and may vary given subtle changes in context. This is part of what needs to be explained. The positive
account in this paper will crystalize the informal reactions described in this section. I use ‘?’ to indicate that
using the marked item is dispreferred; ‘?’ marks a weaker infelicity than ‘#’.
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Its following from our evidence that the colored pencils are in the drawer depends on today
not being one of the days when you accidentally put them on the shelf. Using ‘must’ is pre-
ferred if, and only if, you know that conditions are normal in this way. What is illuminating
is that you can use ‘ought’ even if you aren’t in a position to judge that they are. Accepting
your ‘ought’-claim doesn’t require us to presuppose that your evidence is undefeated.
Consider a deontic case (n. 4). Suppose I am considering whether to fight in the Resis-
tance or take care of my ailing mother. I mention that the value of family, which supports
my helping my mother, is important, and you agree. But the issue is admittedly complex,
and we haven’t settled whether there might be more important competing values. Sensitive
to this, you may find it more appropriate to express your advice that I help my mother by
using ‘ought’ than by using ‘must’:
(5) Me: Family is very important.
You: I agree. You ought to/should (/?must/?have to) tend to your mother.
But if we settle that family is of primary importance, it can becomemore natural to use ‘must’
and for us to accept that I have to help my mother:
(6) Me: Family is most important—more important than country.
You: I agree. You must/have to (/?ought to/?should) tend to your mother.
My having an obligation to help my mother depends on the value of family being more im-
portant5 in my situation than any competing value. Parallel to the epistemic case, what is
illuminating is that you can felicitously use ‘ought’ to express your advice that I help my
mother without assuming that this precondition for my having a genuine obligation is satis-
fied. Accepting your ‘ought’-claim needn’t require us to presuppose that the value of family
is more important than other potentially competing values.
Cases such as (3)–(6) highlight what I regard as the fundamental difference between the
class of weak necessity modals and the class of strong necessity modals. It’s typical to gloss
epistemic notions of necessity as concerning what follows from a body of evidence (knowl-
edge, information), and deontic notions of necessity as concerning what is obligatory.6 Yet
5Or at least not less important; I will bracket complications from incomparabilities and irresolvable dilem-
mas. For theoretical discussion of dilemmas and the ‘ought’/‘must’ distinction, see Swanson 2011, Silk 2012,
2013d: ch. 3, 2015b, and references therein.
6See, a.m.o., Lyons 1977, Coates 1983, Palmer 1990, 2001, Sweetser 1990, Bybee et al. 1994, van der
Auwera & Plungian 1998, Nuyts 2001, Huddleston & Pullum 2002. In saying that the uses of ‘ought’ and
‘must’ have the same type of reading, I’m not assuming that the modals have the same interpretation or stand in
entailment relations (§1). In calling uses “epistemic” I don’t assume that they are factive/entailing, or even that
they convey the same kind of doxastic attitude toward the prejacent (contrast Yalcin 2016). What is important
about the uses in (3)–(4) is that they both directly address the question of where the colored pencils are and
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we can accept your epistemic ‘ought’-claim in (3) without settling that conditions are rele-
vantly normal and thus without settling that our evidence implies that the colored pencils
are in the drawer; and we can accept your deontic ‘ought’-claim in (5) without settling that
family is the most important relevant value and thus without settling that I have a genuine
obligation to help my mother. Accepting ‘Ought φ’ needn’t commit one to accepting that φ
is necessary (epistemically, deontically, etc.).
Whether ‘ought’ or ‘must’ is preferred “depends on context” in the sense of depending
on whether certain preconditions for the prejacent to be necessary (in the above sense) are
accepted: In (3)–(4), how you express your attitude toward the proposition that the colored
pencils are in the drawer depends on your views about the (in)defeasibility of the relevant
evidence; in (5)–(6), how you express your advice that I help my mother depends on the
status in the context of the value of family vis-à-vis other potentially relevant values. This
effect of contextual assumptions on the relative felicity of ‘ought’ and ‘must’ has been generally
underappreciated in theoretical accounts (see n. 4 for notable exceptions).7
Two clarificatory remarks: First, I said that ‘ought’ is preferred in contexts such as in (5)
where it isn’t settled that the precondition for me to have an obligation is satisfied; yet it is
worth observing that ‘must’ may be appropriate in certain contexts. If you can be presumed
a normative authority on the issue and use ‘must’, I may accommodate by accepting that the
value of family takes precedence. This isn’t an isolated phenomenon. Suppose that Alice, a
young teen, is considering with her mother, Martha, whether to take the A-train or C-train
to a concert. The A is quicker, but the C is safer. Martha regards Alice’s safety as paramount.
Although the primacy of safety isn’t common ground, Martha can felicitously say:
(7) You must take the C-train, not the A-train.
The (teleological) necessity of Alice’s taking theC-train depends on the goal of traveling safely
taking priority over the goal of traveling quickly. GivenMartha’s authority in the context, she
expects Alice to accommodate her assumption that this condition is satisfied. Such contexts
notwithstanding—contexts in which the speaker doesn’t have or doesn’t wish to exercise the
relevant authority— ‘ought’ will be preferred.
Second, saying that accepting ‘Ought φ’ doesn’t conventionally commit one to accept-
ing that φ is necessary doesn’t amount to the trivial claim that accepting ‘Ought φ’ needn’t
convey an assessment of the truth or likelihood of the prejacent given a body of information. In calling uses
“deontic” I don’t assume that they are performative or have the same directive force. What is important about
the uses in (5)–(6) is that they both directly address the practical question of what I am to do.
7For instance, the semantics in Finlay 2009, 2010, Lassiter 2011, Swanson 2011 have no obvious mech-
anism for capturing this effect of context on uses of ‘ought’ vs. ‘must’. von Fintel & Iatridou 2008 mentions
in passing a possibly relevant role for context (pp. 139–140), but the issue isn’t investigated. See Rubinstein
2012: §2.2 for extensive broader critical discussion of previous comparative and domain restriction approaches
to weak necessity modals. (More on von Fintel & Iatridou’s and Rubinstein’s accounts in §§4, 6.)
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commit one to accepting ‘Must φ’. One might analyze the examples by positing concepts of
distinctive kinds of necessity, and explain accepting ‘Ought φ’ as accepting that the weaker
kind of necessity holds of φ: one might posit and formalize a concept of weak epistemic
necessity such that accepting that it’s a weak epistemic necessity that d the colored pencils
are in the drawer doesn’t require accepting that today is relevantly normal and the evidence
implies d; and one might posit and formalize a concept of weak deontic necessity (weak obli-
gation) such that accepting that I have a weak obligation to help my mother doesn’t require
accepting that the value of family isn’t defeated. Yet such a move isn’t forced upon us. An
alternative is to stick with the single familiar notions of necessity— e.g., epistemic necessity
as following from a body of evidence, and deontic necessity as being obligatory and following
from a body of norms (n. 6)— and try saying that ‘Ought φ’ can be accepted without accept-
ing that φ is necessary, period. The following sections investigate the prospects for this latter
approach. (More on comparisons with the former approach in due course.)
3 The analysis: Preliminary
Thecore of the approach to the weak/strong necessitymodal distinction developed in the fol-
lowing sections is this: There is nothing specially “strong” about the necessity expressed by
strong necessitymodals. Strong necessitymodals are given their usual semantics/pragmatics:
‘Must φ’ is true iff φ is necessary (in the relevant sense, i.e. epistemically, deontically, etc.;
§2),8 and uses of ‘Must φ’ predicate the necessity of φ of the actual world— just as ‘May φ’ is
true iff φ is possible, and uses of ‘May φ’ predicate the possibility of φ of the actual world. The
apparent “weakness” of weak necessity modals, we can try saying, derives from their brack-
eting the assumption that the necessity of φ need be verified in the actual world. Accepting
‘Ought φ’ needn’t commit one to accepting that the actual circumstances verify the neces-
sity of φ. Weak necessity modals afford a means of coordinating on the implications of our
values, norms, etc. without having to settle precisely how they weigh against one another in
particular circumstances, and while remaining open to new evidence about how they apply.
This section begins developing these ideas within a standard premise-semantic framework
for modals. The next section examines how the account may be implementedmore precisely
in the formal semantics and pragmatics.
As usual, I follow Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991) in treating modals as semantically associ-
ated with a parameter determining a set of premises (propositions). Since modals can occur
in intensional contexts, premise sets are indexed to a world of evaluation. What context
8I will often omit this parenthetical, but it should be understood.
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supplies that determines the reading of a modal is the family of world-indexed premise sets(Pw)w∈W, or premise frame: a function P from worlds w to premise sets P(w).9
It is non-trivial how the considerations which seem intuitively relevant in interpreting
modals are to be represented in the formal objects in the compositional semantics. First,
the expressive, practical, and discourse-managing roles of modals such as ‘ought’ have been
central in motivating expressivist theories such as Gibbard’s. However, the account and for-
malization of theweak/strong necessitymodal distinction to followwill be neutral onmatters
of expressivism (contextualism/relativism/invariantism)—e.g., on what type of psycholog-
ical state of mind is (conventionally) expressed by certain uses of ‘ought’/‘must’ sentences;
whether notions of content or truth(-in-a-context) are given a fundamental explanatory role
in explaining semantic properties of sentences or the dynamics of discourse; whether val-
ues for parameters such as premise frames figure in the derivation of semantic content, and
whether such values are supplied by the context of utterance or a posited context of assess-
ment; and so on. I will speak simply of “context,” and I relativize parameters such as premise
frames simply to worlds. The implementations may be adapted along alternative contextu-
alist/relativist/expressivist/invariantist lines (cf. Silk 2016a: 31–32, 68, 144-145, 221–224).10
(I revisit the motivations for expressivism in §7. More on the practical roles of ‘ought’/‘must’
below and in §5.)
Premise frames afford a natural way of encoding the contents of bodies of norms, pref-
erences, etc.11 Call a conditional norm, preference, expectation, etc. a consideration. A con-
textually supplied premise frame P encodes the content of a body of considerations. The
premises in a premise set P(w) represent what follows from a body of considerations given
the relevant circumstances in w. For instance, suppose you want to go for a run given that
it’s sunny, that you didn’t just eat a burrito, and so on. The content of your preference can be
encoded in a premise frame which assigns a premise set including the proposition that you
go for a run to worlds where it’s sunny, etc. Similarly the normative import of a value of char-
ity might be encoded in a deontic premise frame which assigns a premise set including the
9See also van Fraassen 1973, Lewis 1973, 1981, Veltman 1976. Kratzer calls premise frames ‘conversa-
tional backgrounds’. Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) semantics uses two premise sets: a “modal base” F(w) that repre-
sents a set of relevant background facts in w, and a (possibly inconsistent) “ordering source” G(w) that repre-
sents the content of some ideal in w. Making the limit assumption (Lewis 1973: 19–20), Kratzer’s semantics
treats ‘Must φ’ as true at w iff φ follows from every maximally consistent subset of F(w) ∪ G(w) that includes
F(w) (equivalently (Lewis 1981), iff every ≲G(w)-minimal world in ⋂F(w) is a φ-world).) These complica-
tions won’t be relevant here; I simplify by treating modals as evaluated with respect to a single finite, consistent
premise set. Nothingwill turn on views about the limit assumption, or debates about so-called “weak vs. strong”
semantics for epistemic ‘must’ (whether epistemic ‘must’ takes a non-empty ordering source).
10See, e.g., Gibbard 1990, 2003, Stephenson 2007, Yalcin 2007, 2011, Dreier 2009, Willer 2010, Silk
2013c, 2015a, 2016a, 2017c, MacFarlane 2014, Swanson 2016a.
11See Silk 2017b (cf. 2015a, 2016a: §5.6) for developments of the following approach to interpreting the
formal premise-/ordering-semantic apparatus.
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proposition d that you donate to charity to worlds where you have means of supporting your
family, etc.— as with Pd in (8), for relevant worlds characterized with respect to whether or
not you have a Job, there are Reputable charitable organizations, and there is a local Soup
kitchen, and where u is the proposition that you undermine local aid organizations, and h is
the proposition that you help at a local soup kitchen.
(8) Pd(JRS) = {d,h, . . .}
Pd(JRS) = {u,h, . . .}
Pd(JRS) = {d, . . .}
Pd(JRS) = {h, . . .}⋮
Thenormative importance of helping those in need is reflected in Pd’s assigning a premise set
that includes h to worlds where there is a local soup kitchen. The normative importance of
charitable giving is reflected in Pd’s assigning a premise set that includes d to certain worlds
where available aid organizations are reputable. However, the latter norm isn’t unconditional:
it applies only in worlds where you can support your family, and where the organizations
will put the donations to good use. The relative importance of supporting your family over
helping others is reflected in Pd’s assigning a premise set that doesn’t include d to worlds such
as JRS where the aid organizations are trustworthy but you don’t have a job.
With this way of understanding premise frames at hand, let’s return to the semantics
and diagnoses of the §2-examples. I give strong necessity modals their usual semantics of
necessity: ‘Mustφ’ is true atw, given a contextually supplied premise frameP, iff the prejacent
proposition φ follows from P(w), as in (9) (nn. 3, 9). The truth of ‘Must φ’ depends on the
value of P at the evaluation world. Asserting ‘Must φ’ commits one to accepting that φ follows
from what the relevant considerations enjoin given the facts, P(w) (n. 3).12
(9) JMust φKc,w = 1 iff ⋂Pc(w) ⊆ JφKc (preliminary)
(10) A sentence S is accepted in c iff for every w ∈ c, JSKc,w = 1
What distinguishesweak necessitymodals, I have said, is that they bracketwhether the neces-
sity claim is verified in the actual world. We can adopt the following constraint on a semantics
and pragmatics for ‘ought’, for some relevant body of considerations P:
(11) It’s not the case that: ‘Ought φ’ is accepted in c only if for every w ∈ c,⋂P(w) ⊆ JφKc
12Subscripts on premise frames are used simply to indicate the intended contextually determined assign-
ment. The familiar definition of acceptance in (10) blurs the distinction between contexts and the context sets
(Stalnaker 1978) they determine. The context set is the set of live possibilities, the set of worlds compatible
with what is accepted for purposes of conversation (Stalnaker 1978).
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In a manner to be made precise, uses of ‘Ought φ’ present the possibility that φ follows from
the relevant considerations given certain circumstances, but without committing that such
circumstances obtain or that the considerations actually apply. (We will examine what ac-
cepting ‘Ought φ’ does commit one to shortly.)
Let’s apply the preliminary analyses thus far to our §2-examples. Recall (3)–(4), repro-
duced in (12)–(13).
(12) Me: Where are the colored pencils?
You: They ought to be in the drawer with the crayons.
(13) Me: Where are the colored pencils?
You: They must be in the drawer with the crayons.
As with norms and preferences, one’s expectations given a body of evidence can be condi-
tional— e.g., conditional on things being normal in the relevant respects. Let wN be a world
in which your routine proceeds as normal, and letwN be a world where something abnormal
happens to disrupt your routine.13 Theconditional expectations concerning the colored pen-
cils’ location can be encoded in a premise frame Pe which (inter alia) assigns to wN a premise
set Pe(wN) including the proposition d that the colored pencils are in the drawer, and which
assigns wN a premise set Pe(wN) including ¬d. Given Pe, d is an epistemic necessity at wN
and not at wN. So in order for d to be accepted as epistemically necessary, per (9)–(10), the
context set must be restricted to worlds like wN—worlds where you didn’t get distracted be-
fore putting the colored pencils away, no one played a trick on us and moved them, etc. If
I’m unsure whether you are in a position to assume that nothing unusual led you to place the
colored pencils somewhere else, I may challenge your assumption and raise a possibility that
is incompatible with the epistemic necessity of d, as in (14).
(14) You: The colored pencils must be in the drawer with the crayons.
Me: Really? I see that they aren’t on the shelf. But don’t you sometimes accidentally
put them in the cabinet with the glue sticks?
You: No, I never put them there. (/Oh, I forgot about that.)
But if you use ‘ought’, you aren’t committing to conditions being normal, as reflected in (15);
hence my mentioning such alternative possibilities may be beside the point, as in (16).
(15) You: The colored pencils ought to be in the drawer with the crayons.
Me: I checked and they aren’t there.
You: Oh, then I’m not sure where they are. I would have expected them to be there.
(16) You: The colored pencils ought to be in the drawer with the crayons.
13As above, wN and wN may be understood as representatives of relevant equivalence classes of worlds.
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Me: #Really? I see that they aren’t on the shelf. But don’t you sometimes accidentally
put them in the cabinet with the glue sticks?
You: I know; that’s why I said ought!
Epistemic ‘Ought φ’ can be accepted even if it isn’t settled that certain conditions relevant to
the epistemic necessity of φ are satisfied.
Turn to our deontic modal examples in (5)–(6). My having an obligation to take care of
my mother depends on the value of family being more important in my situation than other
potentially competing values. Hence in order for the propositionm that I tend to mymother
to follow from P(w)—what the normative considerations enjoin given the circumstances—
itmust be the case that the value of family takes precedence inmy situation inw. In (5), unlike
(6), after my assertion is accepted it still isn’t settled whether this condition is satisfied. So,
were you to use ‘must’ you would imply that you are foreclosing certain possibilities that I
have left open. Unless you are in a position to do so (cf. (7)), your using ‘must’ is dispreferred.
By accepting ‘Oughtm’, we can provisionally proceed as if my helping mymother is required
without needing to settle that the value of family is more important than other competing
values we accept or may come to accept.
These examples highlight a critical role for weak necessity modals in discourse and de-
liberation. Take the deontic case. There are typically a range of interests, values, and norms
potentially relevant for determining what to do. How the normatively relevant factors, what-
ever they are, interact is often highly complex. (One needs only a foray into deontic logic or
normative ethics to convince oneself of this.) Theremay be uncertainty about the facts deter-
mining which considerations ultimately apply. For instance, given (8), one might not know
the details about someone’s financial or family situation. Other empirical factors—how do-
nations are used, short- and long-term impacts on those in need, etc.— can be even more
difficult to assess. Hence one might not be in a position to commit to being in a world like
JRS/JRS where norms of charity aren’t outweighed or defeated. Scenarios such as in (5)–(6)
compound these challenges for normative and empirical evaluation. Using deontic ‘Must φ’
may thus be inapt: one might not be in a position to commit to being in a world where φ fol-
lows from what the relevant norms enjoin given the facts. Deontic ‘ought’ affords a means of
guiding our deliberations and plans— indeed our conditional plans, as emphasized through-
out Gibbard’s work on the psychology of normative judgment—while remaining open to
new evidence about what values are at stake, and how they interact with one another and
with the relevant facts.
I have proposed that what makes weak necessity modals “weak” is that they bracket
whether the necessity of the prejacent is verified in the actual world: One can accept ‘Oughtφ’
without presupposing thatφ follows fromwhat the relevant considerations P enjoin given the
facts— e.g., without committing that all preconditions for φ to be a genuine obligation are
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satisfied, that one’s evidence for φ isn’t misleading, and so on. This feature of weak neces-
sity modals isn’t the only dimension along which necessity modals differ (more on which in
§§5–6). However, I claim that it does distinguish the class of weak necessity modals from
the class of strong necessity modals. Previous accounts of weak necessity modals have of-
ten been developed by considering a limited range of modal flavors, in a limited range of
contexts; extensions to other readings, to the extent that they are discussed at all, are often
strained (e.g. Copley 2006, Swanson 2011, Rubinstein 2012, Charlow 2013, Ridge 2014,
Portner & Rubinstein 2016, Yalcin 2016). The account in this paper, by contrast, gener-
alizes across flavors of modality, and captures a precise sense in which the relative felicity of
‘ought’ and ‘must’ depends on standing assumptions. Weak necessity modals afford a means
of coordinating on the implications of our values, expectations, etc. without needing to settle
precisely how they apply and weigh against one another in particular circumstances (n. 7).
The preliminary account thus far raises many questions. Yet even at the present level of
abstraction, we can see that the approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction in
this paper differs crucially from other main approaches in the literature— e.g. probabilistic
and comparative possibility approaches (Finlay 2009, 2010, 2014, Lassiter 2011) and do-
main restriction approaches (Copley 2006, von Fintel & Iatridou 2008, Swanson 2011,
Rubinstein 2012, Charlow 2013). For instance, domain restriction accountsmaintain that
accepting ‘Ought φ’ requires accepting that φ is a necessity, and that the truth of ‘Ought φ’
at w requires that φ is a necessity at w; what distinguishes ‘ought’ from ‘must’ is the logical
strength of the necessity— roughly, implication of the prejacent by a superset of premises
(equivalently, truth of the prejacent throughout a subdomain of worlds). Weak necessity
modals are treated as expressing a logically weaker kind of necessity. The present approach
rejects these claims (§2).
4 Weak necessity and the modal past
Our project is to develop an account to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction that sys-
tematizes a broader range of linguistic phenomena (§1). Taking on this more demanding
goal will require sustained investigations into diverse domains. This section examines how
notions of “ought” are expressed cross-linguistically to motivate several ways of implement-
ing the foregoing approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction and formalizing
the semantics of ‘ought’. §5 shows how the resulting account helps explain various seemingly
unrelated semantic/pragmatic properties of ‘ought’ and ‘must’.
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4.1 Data
Past forms of modals— in English, ‘would’ for ‘will’, ‘could’ for ‘can’, ‘might’ for ‘may’— are
often used not to indicate past time reference, but to express tentativeness or politeness and
weaken the apparent force, as in (17)–(19). These forms are also the forms that appear in the
consequents of subjunctive conditionals, as in (20).
(17) a. I will add one point to this discussion.
b. I would add one point to this discussion.
(18) a. Alice will/may/can’t be at home now.
b. Alice would/might/couldn’t be at home now.
(19) a. May/Can I comment on your proposal?
b. Might/Could I comment on your proposal?
(20) If you took the flight tomorrow, you would/could/might get there in time.
Palmer 2001 dubs such uses of past tense the “modal past.”14
Strikingly, ‘ought’ patterns with the past-marked modal forms. First, ‘ought’ weakens the
apparent force of ‘must’—hence the common label “weak necessity modal.” Second, ‘ought’,
unlike ‘must’, can appear in subjunctive conditionals:
(21) a. If Alice came to the party tomorrow, Bert ought to leave.
b. #If Alice came to the party tomorrow, Bert must(ed) leave.
Third, ‘ought’ is non-entailing. For simple clauses ‘φ’, ‘Ought φ’, unlike ‘Must φ’, is compatible
with ‘¬φ’:
14See also, e.g., James 1982, Coates 1983, Fleischman 1989, Bybee 1995, Iatridou 2000, Huddleston&
Pullum 2002. Terminology varies among authors. Weakness/“modal past” interpretations of past tense aren’t
limited to uses of modal verbs, as in the present time readings of (i)–(iii-a).
(i) I wanted to ask you a question. (Bybee 1995: ex. 21)
(ii) I thought/was thinking about asking you to dinner. (Fleischman 1989: 8)
(iii) a. A: How old is John?
B: He’d be about sixty. (weakness interpretation)
b. (If John were still alive,) he’d be about sixty. (implicit CF)
(cf. Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 200–201)
I am not presupposing that all modal-past forms necessarily convey weakness/tentativeness relative to their
nonpast counterparts (cf. epistemic ‘might’ in contemporary English; Coates 1983, Palmer 1990, Huddle-
ston & Pullum 2002, Collins 2007). My descriptive use of Palmer’s label makes no theoretical assumptions
about how the modal/weakness/tentativeness interpretations arise or are related to temporal interpretations of
past morphology (n. 18).
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(22) I could give to Oxfam, but I won’t.
(23) a. Alice ought to be here by now, but she isn’t.
b. #Alice must be here by now, but she isn’t.
Indeed, when used with the perfect, ‘ought’ implicates the negation of the prejacent.
(24) I could have given to Oxfam. (Implicates: I didn’t)
(25) a. We ought to have given to Oxfam. (Implicates: we didn’t)
b. #We must have given to Oxfam (but we didn’t).
‘Must’ cannot even receive a deontic reading when used with past time reference. ‘Ought’,
unlike ‘must’, can be used to communicate that an obligation held in the past. That ‘ought’
can take scope under the perfect in (25a) is a fourth respect in which ‘ought’ patterns with
past-marked modal forms (Condoravdi 2002).
In sum, although ‘must’ doesn’t have a past form, ‘ought’, we can try saying, functions
notionally as its modal past (cf. Palmer 1990, 2001). This is surprising. But it becomes
less surprising when we examine other languages. Let’s use ‘ought’ for the notion which
in English is expressed with weak necessity modals such as ‘ought’ (‘should’, etc.), and use
‘must’ for the notion which in English is expressed with strong necessity modals such as
‘must’ (‘have to’, etc.). As emphasized in von Fintel & Iatridou’s (2008) seminal discussion
of weak necessity modals, it’s cross-linguistically common to mark the semantic distinction
between ought andmustmorphologically rather than lexically (see also Palmer 2001, Mc-
Gregor&Wagner 2006, Van Linden&Verstraete 2008,Matthewson 2010). A notion
of ought is often expressed not by using a different word— like ‘ought’ in English—but by
using the modal-past form of a strong necessity modal, i.e. the form of a strong necessity
modal that is used in counterfactuals.15
von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) approach the cross-linguistic data in a domain restriction
account of weak necessity modals. They treat weak necessity modals as quantifying over “the
best of the best” worlds— roughly, the relevant P(w)-compatible worlds that are compatible
with an additional premise set representing a secondary ideal (in Kratzer’s terminology, a
secondary ordering source).16 In passing, von Fintel & Iatridou speculate that “the counter-
15As von Fintel & Iatridou note (2008: 126n.22), ‘ought’ fits the cross-linguistic pattern historically; it was
formerly the past subjunctive of the verb ‘owe’. Modal-past forms in other languages may be derived from
various elements, not simply past tense (e.g. Iatridou 2000).
16More precisely (see n. 9): For a set of worldsW and premise set S, let the S-minimal worlds inW be the
worlds u ∈ W such that no world v ∈ W satisfies a proper superset of propositions p ∈ S. (For finite consistent
premise sets the set of S-minimal worlds isW ∩⋂ S.) Let s be a set of relevant worlds (as e.g. determined by a
Kratzerian modal base), G1(w) be a premise set representing some primary ideal, and G2(w) be a premise set
representing some secondary ideal. On von Fintel & Iatridou’s semantics, whereas ‘must’ universally quantifies
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factual marking is co-opted here in a somewhat meta-linguistic kind of way: ‘if we were in
a context in which the secondary ordering source was promoted [to primary status], then
it would be a strong necessity that…’ ” (2008: 139). The tentativeness associated with coun-
terfactual marking is attributed to the fact that the premises in the secondary premise set
needn’t apply: “The choice of whether to really promote the secondary ordering source is left
open” (2008: 139).
I find these suggestions about the cross-linguistic data unsatisfying (see Rubinstein 2012
for further criticisms). First, von Fintel & Iatridou briefly suggest treating the secondary or-
dering source for epistemic readings as representing what is normally the case, and the sec-
ondary ordering source for deontic readings as representing “less coercive sets of rules and
principles (2008: 119)”; however, no general story is given about what primary vs. secondary
ordering sources represent per se, or how an ordering source is determined as primary or
secondary for different types of readings across contexts. Absent an independent under-
standing of what makes it the case about a speaker that she is counterfactually promoting a
secondary ordering source, the proposed story about the role of the counterfactual marking
seems ad hoc. Aworry is that the explanation of the tentativeness associatedwith counterfac-
tual morphology redescribes what needs to be explained. The tentativeness is “explained” by
introducing a parameter representing “shakier assumptions” (2008: 119n.9) that may not ap-
ply—uncharitably put, a parameter representing considerations one may only be tentatively
committed to. Finally, it’s unclear how von Fintel & Iatridou’s explanation would generalize
to tentativeness effects of counterfactual morphology on other lexical items—e.g., possi-
bility modals like ‘might’, or desire verbs like ‘wish’, which as von Fintel & Iatridou note,
are in many languages expressed via counterfactual morphology on the word for ‘want’ (see
Iatridou 2000, n. 14). For instance, interpreting modal-past forms of possibility modals
with respect to a secondary ordering source incorrectly predicts a strengthening effect. The
tentative use of ‘might’/‘could’ in (19) cannot be derived by counterfactually “promoting” a
secondary ordering source and then evaluating the possibility of the prejacent.17
4.2 Implementations: A modal-past approach
This subsection examines how independent work on the semantics/pragmatics of counter-
factual marking may be incorporated into our analyses of ‘ought’ and ‘must’. I want to be
over the G1(w)-minimal s-worlds, ‘ought’ universally quantifies over a subset of these worlds: the G2(w)-
minimal worlds among the G1(w)-minimal s-worlds. ‘Ought’ quantifies over the G2(w)-minimal worlds that
‘must’ quantifies over. See Sloman 1970, Williams 1981, McNamara 1990 for informal precedents. I return
to general worries for domain restriction analyses below.
17For a set of relevant worlds s and primary and secondary ordering sources G1(w),G2(w), let i be the set
of G1(w)-minimal s-worlds, and j be the set of G2(w)-minimal i-worlds. Since j ⊆ i, that there is a φ-world in
j asymmetrically implies that there is a φ-world in i (n. 16).
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clear that I am not assuming that lexicalized weak necessity modals are “decomposed” into a
strong necessity modal and counterfactual features (schematically STRONG+CF). Method-
ologically, considering the cross-linguistic data may provide insight into the semantics of
lexicalized expressions of ought. But we should be careful not to “read off” a semantics for
‘ought’ from a semantics for ‘must’ and counterfactual morphology. ‘Ought’ doesn’t mean
‘would have to’ (more on which in §7.1).
It’s generally agreed that counterfactual marking signals that the worlds being talked
about (“topic worlds”) needn’t be candidates for actuality. There are various ways of for-
malizing this signal and deriving it in the grammar. To fix ideas I assume that counterfactual
marking cancels a presupposition (e.g. associated with indicative) that the modal’s domain
of quantification, or set of topic worlds more generally, is a subset of the context set.18
I have said that no innovations are introduced into the semantics/pragmatics of strong
necessity modals. ‘Must φ’ is given its familiar semantics of necessity— ‘Must φ’ is true at w
iff φ follows from P(w)—and uses of ‘Must φ’ carry the usual indicative presupposition that
the worlds being talked about are in the context set. One way of implementing the general
indicative presupposition is as restricting the domain of the interpretation function to proper
points of evaluation—contexts c and worlds w such that w ∈ c. Applying this to the case of
a necessity modal yields:19
Definition 1. JMust φKc = λw ∶w ∈ c . ⋂P(w) ⊆ JφKc
Uttering ‘Must φ’ predicates the necessity of φ throughout the context set, i.e. predicates the
proposition that φ follows from P(w) of every world in the context set— just as uttering
‘May φ’ predicates the possibility of φ throughout the context set, or uttering ‘φ’ predicates
φ throughout the context set. The treatment of ‘must’ vis-à-vis necessity is parallel to the
treatment of ‘may’, ‘can’, etc. vis-à-vis possibility:
Definition 2. JMay φKc = λw ∶w ∈ c . ⋂(P(w) ∪ {JφKc}) ≠ ∅
It’s in this sense that there is nothing special or distinctively “strong” in the semantics/pragmatics
of (so-called) strong necessity modals.
Turn to weak necessity modals. A natural idea is that the counterfactual marking in the
relevant languages cancels an assumption that the relevant worlds at which the prejacent is
18An alternative is to treat counterfactualmarking as positively presupposing that the set of topic worlds isn’t
included in the context set. For discussion and technical implementations see e.g. Stalnaker 1975, vonFintel
1998, Iatridou 2000, Ippolito 2003, Schlenker 2005, Arregui 2009, Bittner 2011.
19In a framework with object-language world-variables, the presupposition would be that the assignment
function maps the given world-variable to a world in the context set (cf. Schlenker 2005).
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necessary are in the context set20—hence the §2-observation and constraint in (11) that ac-
cepting ‘Ought φ’ doesn’t require accepting that all the preconditions for φ to be necessary
are satisfied. The apparent “weakness” of uses of ‘Ought φ’, compared to uses of ‘Must φ’, de-
rives from failing to presuppose that the topic worlds where φ is necessary are in the context
set. Call this approach amodal-past approach to weak necessity modals and the weak/strong
necessity modal distinction. The remainder of this section presents several ways of imple-
menting a modal-past approach in the formal semantics and begins investigating their costs
and benefits.
One straightforward way of treating ‘ought’ as the semantic modal past of ‘must’ would
be to treat ‘ought’ as having an ordinary semantics of necessity, like ‘must’, but lacking the
presupposition that the worlds being talked about— the relevant worlds at which φ is nec-
essary— are in the context set, as reflected in Definition 3.
Definition 3. JOught φKc = λw . ⋂P(w) ⊆ JφKc (v1)
Informally, uttering ‘Ought φ’ places the necessity claim on the “conversational table,” but
doesn’t conventionally commit one to its truth (cf. Silk 2016b). Implementing a modal-past
approach as in Definition 3 faces pressing challenges in the discourse dynamics and compo-
sitional semantics. On a standard Stalnakerian theory of conversation, assertions propose to
restrict the context set to worlds where the asserted content is true (Stalnaker 1978). But
for anyw ∈ c, ‘Oughtφ’ is true atw according toDefinition 3 iff ‘Mustφ’ is true atw according
to Definition 1.21 Some alternative mechanism would be needed to distinguish how ‘ought’
and ‘must’ update context, e.g. allowing uses of ‘ought’ to distinguish among worlds outside
the context set or have some non-eliminative effect. Second, it isn’t obvious how the relative
weakness of ‘ought’ vis-à-vis ‘must’ would carry over in embedded environments that shift
the evaluation world, e.g., indicative conditionals or attitude ascriptions.
Oneway of avoiding these challenges is to build a counterfactual element into the seman-
tics of ‘ought’. Consider Definition 4, for contextually supplied selection function h.
Definition 4. JOught φKc,w = 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ hc(w) ∶⋂Pc(w′) ⊆ JφKc (v2)
To a first approximation, one can think of h(w) as picking out a set of relevant worlds that
are minimal/“preferred” in some contextually relevant sense—most normal, expected, de-
20On this I disagreewithArregui 2010. ThoughArregui associates ‘should’ with a pastmorphology feature,
she denies that the feature is interpreted with ‘should’. Arregui maintains that ‘Should φ’ presupposes that the
modal’s quantificational domain is included in the context set (for non-stative ‘φ’). We have seen that this is
incorrect. Non-entailing uses ‘(Should φ) ∧ ¬φ’ are consistent (more on which in §5):
(i) Alice should give to charity but she won’t.
21The right-to-left direction is obvious. Left-to-right: if JOught φKc(w) = 1, then ⋂P(w) ⊆ JφKc; but then,JMust φKc(w) = 1 since, by hypothesis, w ∈ c.
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sirable, etc., depending on the context (cf. Starr 2010: 167, Grosz 2012).22 In (12), h(w)
might select the maximally w-normal worlds where you don’t get distracted before putting
the colored pencils away, no one hides them, etc.—worlds likewN. In (26), h(w)might select
the maximallyw-similar worlds where you have a job, the available charities are trustworthy,
etc.—worlds like JRS from (8).
(26) You ought to donate to charity.
‘Ought φ’ is true iff theseworldsw′ verify the necessity of φ, i.e. iff φ follows from the relevant
considerations P at every w′ ∈ h(w). The point from (11) that accepting ‘Ought φ’ doesn’t
require settling that φ is actually necessary is captured via h: the set of worlds h(w) at which
the necessity of φ is evaluated might include the evaluation world w, but it might not.
Definition 4 uses a simple selection function to determine the worlds at which the ne-
cessity of the prejacent is evaluated. The semantics could be complicated by deriving the
set of selected worlds from more basic elements, such as independently represented order-
ings/premise sets of the relevant types (normality, desirability, etc.). Even bracketing such
structure, the selection of worlds could be treated as explicitly depending on the prejacent φ
or a contextually relevant set of circumstances C, i.e. h(w, φ,C). This would reflect the intu-
itive idea that in interpreting ‘Ought φ’ one evaluates what follows from P at worlds satisfying
certain conditions plausibly relevant to whether φ is a necessity:23 in (12) one looks at worlds
u satisfying what is normally the case in matters concerning where the colored pencils are,
and one checks whether, conditional on such facts, the relevant information (represented
by the given epistemic premise frame Pe) implies that the colored pencils are in the drawer,
i.e. whether ⋂Pe(u) ⊆ drawer; in (26) one looks at worlds v satisfying what is normally or
preferably the case inmatters concerning whether to donate, and one checks whether, condi-
tional on such facts, the relevant norms (represented by the given deontic premise frame Pd)
enjoin you to donate, i.e. whether ⋂Pd(v) ⊆ donate. Alternatively, we might simply use a
world-indexed function h, and appeal to such additional factors in an extra-semantic account
of how h is determined in concrete discourse contexts.
The approach in Definition 4 raises the question of what distinguishes ‘Ought φ’ from
counterfactual necessity sentences ‘Ifχ, it would have to be thatφ’ (more onwhich shortly). A
comparative semantics such as Definition 5may avoid this issue—where ≺w is a partial order
on propositions along a contextually relevant dimension (likelihood, normality, desirability,
22I often use double quotes around ‘preferred’ as a reminder that what is intended is the generalized notion
of minimality, not necessarily bouletic or deontic (more in §7.1).
23My 2012 implemented these ideas by analyzing weak necessity modals as expressing a kind of conditional
necessity (cf. Wertheimer 1972). I no longer endorse this as a way of capturing the points in §§2–3 or under-
standing a modal-past approach. Conditional necessity analyses make pressing the challenge of distinguishing
uses of ‘ought’ from (implicit or explicit) conditional necessity claims (see below and §7.1).
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etc.), and s(w, p) is the set of closest p-worlds to w, understanding the relevant closeness
relation as the relation that would figure in interpreting a counterfactual.
Definition5. JOught φKc,w = 1 iff {u ∶u ∈ s(w,⋂Pc(u) ⊆ JφKc)} ≺w {v ∶ v ∈ s(w,⋂Pc(v) ⊈ JφKc)}
(v3)
This treats ‘Ought φ’ as saying that it would be better (in a relevant sense) if φ was necessary
(in a relevant sense).24 Like Definition 4, Definition 5 avoids treating the truth of ‘Ought φ’ at
w as requiring that φ be a necessity at w. The closest worlds u at which φ is necessary needn’t
be in the context set. Yet we can still see how uses of ‘ought’ may bear on interlocutors’ views
about what is necessary. ‘Ought φ’ introduces the possibility that φ is necessary and com-
ments on it. The attitudinal comment is that the (closest) worlds in which φ is necessary are≺w-better—more desirable, normal, expected, etc., depending on the context. A potential
worry is why the semantics for ‘ought’ and ‘must’ should be so dissimilar. One must provide
a precise sense in which ‘ought’ is weaker than ‘must’ (logically, conversationally). Further, it
isn’t obvious how a comparative semantics like Definition 5might derive from STRONG+CF
or shed on light how ought-interpretations of STRONG+CF arise in other languages.
Definitions 3–5 provide several avenues for developing a modal-past implementation
of the core ideas from §2. The semantics avoid analyzing accepting ‘Ought φ’ in terms
of φ being a necessity (in any sense) at every w in the context set, and they offer precise
representations of ‘ought’ as the notional modal-past of ‘must’. ‘Ought’ is interpreted with
respect to the same body of considerations Pc as ‘must’, and “introduces” the proposition[λw.⋂Pc(w) ⊆ JφKc] that the prejacent is a necessity relative to Pc; what distinguishes ‘ought’
is that attitude taken toward that proposition needn’t be acceptance— in Definition 3, by
allowing improper points of evaluation; in Definition 4, by including an additional layer of
modality and evaluating the truth of [λw.⋂Pc(w) ⊆ JφKc] throughout a set of possibly coun-
terfactual worlds; and in Definition 5, by commenting on the preferredness (in a relevant
sense) of [λw.⋂Pc(w) ⊆ JφKc]. It will be useful in what follows to have a particular analysis
at hand. To fix ideas I will generally assume the semantics in Definition 4. It’s less clear how
a comparative meaning such as Definition 5 might come to be given to ought-expressing
uses of STRONG+CF in other languages, and I think the ideas motivating Definition 3 are
more perspicuously developed in a dynamic setting (see Silk 2016b). I leave more thorough
comparisons for future work.
24Definition 5 could be refined depending on one’s views on the semantics of comparative possibility (Las-
siter 2011, Kratzer 2012), but the basic idea should be clear enough. Contrast the comparative probability
semantics for ‘ought’ in Finlay 2009, 2010, 2014, which treats ‘Ought φ’ as saying (roughly) that φ is more
likely than any relevant alternative to φ. In contrast Definition 5 treats ‘Ought φ’ as making a comparative
claim about the necessity of φ, rather than a comparative claim about φ, and it generalizes the relevant com-
parative notion via the context-dependent parameter ≺. (See Rubinstein 2014, Portner & Rubinstein 2016)
for additional discussion of connections between weak necessity modals and comparatives/gradability.)
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4.3 Entailments?
An initially plausible thought is that— as the (not-necessarily-innocent) labels might sug-
gest— strong necessitymodals entail weak necessitymodals, which entail possibilitymodals.
However, a worry for the modal-past analyses is that they seem to predict the consistency of
sentences ‘Ought φ and must ¬φ’ and ‘Ought φ and ¬may φ’, as in (27).
(27) #I mustn’t/can’t/may not lie to Alice, but I ought to.
The ‘must’/‘may’ conjunct is true at w iff the necessity of ¬φ is verified at w; the ‘ought’ con-
junct is true at w, assuming the semantics in Definition 4, iff the necessity of φ is verified
at every “preferred” (desirable, expected, etc.) world w′ ∈ h(w). Accepting (27) requires re-
stricting the context set to worlds w such that P(w) implies ¬φ and, for every w′ ∈ h(w),
P(w′) implies φ. Absent further constraints on h, such conditions are consistent.
I think this prediction is actually a feature, not a bug. ‘Must’, ‘ought’, and ‘may’ cannot
be ordered by logical strength simply in virtue of their conventional meanings. ‘Must φ’ ⊧
‘May φ’, no doubt about that; but ‘Must φ’ ⊭ ‘Ought φ’ and ‘Ought φ’ ⊭ ‘May φ’.
Epistemic ‘Must φ’ commits the speaker to high credence in φ and epistemic ‘May φ’
commits the speaker to some credence in φ. Epistemic ‘must’ entails epistemic ‘may’. But
epistemic ‘Ought φ’ doesn’t commit the speaker to any credence in φ. This invalidates the
entailments between epistemic ‘ought’ and epistemic ‘must’/‘may’ (cf. Copley 2006, Silk
2013b, 2016b, Swanson 2016a, Yalcin 2016; see n. 6):25
(28) #Alice can’t be home yet; she hasn’t called, and she always calls right away to let us
know she got back safely. Shemust be home already. I hope there wasn’t an accident.
(#¬Can φ ∧Must φ)
(29) Alice must not/can’t be home yet; she hasn’t called, and she always calls right away
to let us know she got back safely. She ought to be home already. I hope there wasn’t
an accident.
(Must ¬φ ∧ Ought φ)
(¬Can φ ∧ Ought φ)
Although epistemic ‘Ought φ’ doesn’t commit the speaker to any unconditional credence in
φ, it still conveys a doxastic attitude. Informally, it conveys a conditional attitude about the
necessity of φ given a body of evidence, on the assumption that conditions are relevantly
normal (§§2–4; cf. Groefsema 1995: 72–73; Wedgwood 2007: 118–119; Yalcin 2016).
One may infer from the denial of ‘φ’ that conditions aren’t normal. Yet since ‘ought’ can be
25I use ‘can’t’ for the external negation (¬ < can), sincewith epistemic ‘may not’ the negation is internal. With
‘mustn’t’ the negation is internal (must < ¬). With deontic ‘may not’ the negation is external (¬ < can/may).
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used to talk about the modal status of φ at non-actual possibilities, epistemic ‘Ought φ’ can
still be true and accepted.
It’s hard to come upwith coherent deontic examples analogous to (29). Hard, but perhaps
not impossible:
(30) I must tell my wife about the affair. I know I shouldn’t; it’ll only hurt her. But I must.
(31) I know I shouldn’t tell my wife about the affair; it’ll only hurt her. But I can’t lie to
her.
(32) #I must tell my wife about the affair. I know I can’t; it’ll only hurt her. But I must.
It isn’t immediately obvious what to say about these examples. It’s interesting that entailments
from ‘must’ to ‘ought’ and from ‘ought’ to ‘may’ seem more compelling with non-epistemic
readings. Yet insofar as we want unified semantics for modal verbs that generalize across
readings, we should prefer an account that avoids treating the entailments as semantically
valid.
5 “Weakness” in weak necessity modals
§4 developed the §3-account by treating ‘ought’ as the notional modal past of ‘must’ and
incorporating general insights about the semantics/pragmatics of counterfactual marking.
This section shows how a modal-past account of the “weakness” of weak necessity modals
systematizes several seemingly unrelated puzzles of entailingness and performativity with
‘ought’ and ‘must’.
5.1 Diagnosing weakness
Amodal-past analysis gives precise expression to the informal intuition that ‘ought’ is weaker
and more tentative than ‘must’. In uttering ‘Ought φ’ the speaker fails to mark the necessity
claim as being about worlds that are candidates for actuality. However, as Stalnaker notes,
“normally a speaker is concerned only with possible worlds within the context set, since this
set is defined as the set of possible worlds among which the speaker wishes to distinguish”
(1975: 69). So, uttering ‘Ought φ’ implicates that one isn’t in a position to commit to φ’s
being a necessity throughout the set of live possibilities. Grice’s first quantitymaxim—“Make
your contribution as informative as is required” (Grice 1989: 26)— can then be exploited to
generate a familiar upper-bounding implicature (Horn 1972, Gazdar 1979; n. 26): Using
‘ought’ implicates that for all one knows—better, for all one is willing to presuppose in the
conversation— ‘Must φ’ is false. This implicature has the usual properties of implicatures;
it’s reinforceable, cancelable, and suspendable:
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(1a) I ought to help the poor, but I don’t have to.
(2a) I ought to help the poor. In fact, I must.
(33) I ought to help the poor. Maybe I have to.
In (2a) the speaker first conveys that the worlds in which my helping the poor is deontically
necessary needn’t be live possibilities, and then commits that what holds in the formerworlds
also holds in the actual world. The implicature data with ‘ought’ can be treated analogously
to implicature data with subjunctive conditionals.
(34) a. If you had the flu, you would have exactly the symptoms you have now.
(cf. Anderson 1951: 53)
b. If you had the flu, you would have very different symptoms from the symptoms
you have now.
c. If you had the flu, you would be sick. Maybe you do have the flu; you are pretty
congested.
Likewise we can assimilate the tentativeness of ‘ought’ to the tentativeness of modal-past
forms generally, as in non-counterfactual subjunctive conditionals (“future-less-vivid” con-
ditionals) such as (20) above and (35).
(35) If you came to our party tomorrow—and I’m not saying that you will— you would
have a great time.
Using the past form highlights the possibility that the marked clause might not ultimately
be accepted. The basis of the scale between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ isn’t fundamentally logical but
epistemic strength (§4)). ‘Ought’ and ‘must’ are ordered, not in terms of e.g. subset/superset
relations in their domains of quantification, as per domain restriction accounts (§§2–3), but
in terms of epistemic attitude toward the proposition that φ is necessary.26
5.2 Entailingness and directive force
Though many authors have claimed that epistemic ‘Ought φ’ expresses that φ is probable,27
we have seen that this isn’t quite right (§4): Epistemic ‘Ought φ’ doesn’t commit the speaker
to any unconditional credence in φ, as reflected in (23), reproduced in (36).
(36) a. Alice ought to be here by now, but she isn’t.
26Cf. Verstraete 2005b, 2006, Van Linden & Verstraete 2008.
27E.g., Sloman 1970, Horn 1972, Wertheimer 1972, Thomson 2008, Finlay 2010, 2014, Lassiter 2011,
Wheeler 2013, Ridge 2014.
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b. #Alice must be (/may be, /is probably) here by now, but she isn’t.
Epistemic ‘(Must φ) ∧ ¬φ’ is anomalous in a way that epistemic ‘(Ought φ) ∧ ¬φ’ is not.
Surprisingly, there is robust evidence that this is the case with deontic readings as well.28
When one wishes to convey that one thinks a given obligation won’t be satisfied, one typically
uses ‘ought’/‘should’ rather than ‘must’.
(37) a. He should/ought to come tomorrow, but he won’t.
b. *He must come tomorrow, but he won’t.
(Palmer 1990: 123; judgment Palmer’s)
(38) a. You ought to help your mother, but you won’t (/I know you won’t).
b. ?You must help your mother, but you won’t (/I know you won’t).
As Eric Campbell insightfully puts it, “The idea that one must (not) do something… does
not generally indicate that one option is simply better than another option, but that the other
is out of bounds,” “off the table,” “closed off”; alternative possibilities become “unthinkable”
(Campbell 2014: 463–465). Of course obligations can go unfulfilled. What is interesting
is that speakers appear to assume otherwise, at least for the purposes of conversation, when
expressing obligations with ‘must’.29
Call data concerning sentences of the form ‘(MODALφ)∧¬φ’ entailingness data (though
see n. 30). Our discussion in §4 suggests a natural way of capturing entailingness data such as
(36)–(38). Evaluating ‘Ought φ’ can take us to worlds outside the context set when assessing
the necessity of φ. There is no requirement that the value of the premise frame P at worlds
outside the context set be compatible with the common ground. So, ‘Ought φ’ can be true
at a world w in the context set even if every world in the context set is a ¬φ-world; hence
the coherence of ‘(Ought φ) ∧ ¬φ’. Since ‘Must φ’ doesn’t have a counterfactual element to
its meaning, the context set must include ⋂P(w), for all worlds w in the context set. So, if
28For theoretical discussion see esp. Werner 2003: 124–137; Ninan 2005; Portner 2009: 103, 189–
196, Silk 2013b, 2016b. See also, a.o., Leech 1971, Wertheimer 1972, Harman 1973, Lyons 1977,
Woisetschlaeger 1977, Williams 1981, Coates 1983, Palmer 1990, Sweetser 1990, Myhill 1996, Hud-
dleston & Pullum 2002, Swanson 2008, 2016a, Close & Aarts 2010, Campbell 2014, Goddard 2014.
29Cf.: “The basic strong obligation component common to [‘got to’, ‘have to’, and ‘must’] is ‘I can’t think: X
will not V’; note that this does not mean that the obligated event will inevitably take place but rather that the
speaker is operating on this assumption” (Myhill 1996: 348–349).
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‘Mustφ’ is accepted,¬φ cannot be satisfied throughout the context set; hence the incoherence
of ‘(Must φ) ∧ ¬φ’ on any reading (qualifications shortly).30,31
How exactly to derive these points about the relation between the modals’ premise sets
and the context set depends on general issues of presupposition and verbal mood (see §4).
For instance, with modals that lack a counterfactual meaning component, there might be
a context-set presupposition on the embedded clause that it denotes a proposition defined
only at worlds in the context set (e.g., due to an indicative presupposition transmitted to the
embedded clause, or a presupposition in the modal’s lexical semantics regarding the eval-
uation worlds for its clausal argument). So, for ‘must φ’ to be true at w, ⋂P(w) must be a
subset of {u ∶ [λv ∶ v ∈ c . JφKc,v = 1](u) = 1}, hence ⋂P(w) must be a subset of the context
set. Alternatively, there might be a general presupposition on the values of quantifier do-
main variables, such as premise frames, that they be compatible with the common ground
at worlds in the context set. Either way, what is important here is that non-counterfactual
modal constructions (modal sentences, indicative conditionals, etc.) presuppose that the do-
30This explanation leaves open whether ‘¬φ’ may be true at some worlds in the context set, and thus seems
to predict that accepting deontic ‘Mustφ’ is compatible with with accepting the epistemic possibility of¬φ. This
prediction appears to be borne out by corpus data. Verstraete 2007 cites the naturally occurring example in
(i) with an imperative, adapted with ‘must’ in (ii).
(i) You’ve got to take a stand Tom. You’ve got to do it mate. […] Don’t stand for it, because if you do you’ll
just get trampled on. (CB ukspok) (Verstraete 2007: ex. 23)
(ii) You mustn’t stand for it, because if you do you’ll just get trampled on.
Though (iii) strikes me as somewhat anomalous, this is arguably due to a general norm of cooperative con-
versation that interlocutors do what they can to make the actual world be among the preferred/best worlds
(cf. Portner 2007: 358). On this diagnosis, (iii) would be anomalous to the extent that it’s anomalous to com-
mit someone to help see to it that φ while expressly admitting the possibility of ¬φ.
(iii) ?You must go to confession, but maybe you won’t (/you might not).
31This of course isn’t the only possible diagnosis. One might attempt to explain the entailingness data by
positing additional features of the conventional meaning of ‘must’. For instance, first, one might say that ‘must’
is only interpreted with respect to a modal base (or the union of several modal bases), not an ordering source
(n. 9; cf. Hacquard 2009: 290n.9). (As far as the interpretation of ‘must’ goes, “all laws are natural laws”
(cf. Piaget 1962: 340).) Since modal bases consist of propositions true at the evaluation world, ‘Must φ’ would
entail ‘φ’. Second, following Swanson 2016a one might include in the semantic entry for ‘must’ but not ‘ought’
a constraint requiring high credence in the prejacent. Third, one might appeal to more basic performative
properties of ‘ought’ and ‘must’ (see n. 32). However, it would be theoretically preferable if we could explain the
data in terms of independent features of the semantics of ‘ought’ and ‘must’, as I am arguing we can. There are
reasons for introducing ordering sources into the semantics, both empirical and conceptual (e.g., for handling
inconsistent premise sets and gradability, and distinguishing dynamic and deontic modality) (Kratzer 1981,
1991; cf. Grove 1988, Spohn 1988, Kaufmann 2005). I argue below that the analysis in the main text derives
the modals’ contrasting performative properties without needing to take them as basic. We can explain the
entailingness data without ad hoc stipulations about ‘must’. For general discussion of entailingness with root
modals in the perfective, see Hacquard 2009.
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main of quantification is included in the context set. ‘Ought φ’ lacks this presupposition.
Parallel to our points in §3, there is nothing distinctively “strong” posited about ‘must’ vis-
à-vis entailingness: The incoherence of accepting ‘(Must φ) ∧ ¬φ’ follows from the modal’s
ordinary semantics of necessity and general context-set presuppositions associated with in-
dicative. It’s the non-entailingness of ‘ought’, and the consistency of ‘(Ought φ) ∧ ¬φ’, that is
given special explanation.
Deontic ‘ought’ and ‘must’ are often thought to differ in illocutionary force. Paul McNa-
mara characterizes the phenomena well:
To say that one ought to take a certain option ismerely to provide a nudge in that
direction. Its typical uses are to offer guidance, a word to the wise (“counsel of
wisdom”), to recommend, advise or prescribe a course of action…In contrast, to
say that one must take a certain option is to be quite forceful. Its typical uses are
to command, decree, enact, exhort, entreat, require, regulate, legislate, delegate,
or warn. Its directive force is quite strong. (McNamara 1990: 156)
Previous accounts often capture this contrast by stipulating an ad hoc performative element
in the lexical semantics of ‘must’, such as an independent dynamic entry.32 Our account of
entailingness data suggests a strategy for deriving the contrasting speech-act properties of
deontic ‘ought’ and ‘must’ from their static semantics and general pragmatic considerations.
Accepting ‘Must φ’ is incompatible with denying ‘φ’. So, if the truth of ‘φ’ is assumed to
depend on the actions of the addressee, updating with ‘Must φ’ will commit her to seeing to it
thatφ (or, in the general case, commit the interlocutors to presupposing that the subject of the
obligation is committed to seeing to it that φ). So, it’s no surprise that ‘must’ should often be
thought to be conventionally directive. By contrast, since accepting ‘Ought φ’ is compatible
with denying ‘φ’, updatingwith ‘Oughtφ’ needn’t commit anyone to seeing to it thatφ. Even if
deontic ‘ought’ can be used to perform a directive speech act in certain contexts, it doesn’t do
so as amatter of its conventionalmeaning. Yet given our discussion of the conversational role
of ‘ought’ (§§2–3), it’s unsurprising that utterances of deontic ‘Ought φ’ should often perform
more moderate speech acts of recommending or advising. Uttering ‘Ought φ’ can convey
one’s preference that ‘φ’ be accepted, but without imposing the truth of ‘φ’ on the common
ground. As Gibbard writes, following Stevenson, the speaker “is making a conversational
demand. He is demanding that the audience accept what he says, that it share the state of
mind he expresses” (Gibbard 1990: 172), though in a “more subtle, less fully conscious way”
32See Ninan 2005; Portner 2007: 363–365, 2009: 103–105, 189–196; Swanson 2008: 1203–1204; cf. Fin-
lay 2014: 172–174; Ridge 2014: 27–36. See also Leech 1971, Lakoff 1972a, Wertheimer 1972, Lyons 1977,
Woisetschlaeger 1977, Coates 1983, Palmer 1990, Bybee et al. 1994, Verstraete 2001, Huddleston
& Pullum 2002, Tagliamonte 2004, Leech et al. 2009, Goddard 2014, Ridge 2014. Cf. Van Linden &
Verstraete 2011: 153, Van Linden 2012: 69 on differences in force amongweak and strong deontic adjectives.
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than by issuing “an imperative” (Stevenson 1937: 25)—or, we might say, than by using
‘must’. Deontic ‘ought’ generally provides a less face-threatening alternative to deontic ‘must’,
in particular in contexts where the speaker might be construed as imposing on the addressee
or relevant subject.33
Our treatments of differences in “strength” between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ are compatible
with the observation that uses of ‘must’ may carry an intuitively weaker conversational force
in certain contexts. Consider (39).
(39) [Context: You’re hosting a party. You wish to offer the guests a cake that you baked
yourself. You say:]
a. You must have some of this cake.
b. You should/ought to have some of this cake.
c. You may have some of this cake. (Lakoff 1972a: 910)
As Lakoffobserves, using ‘must’ would bemost polite, conveying an offer, while using ‘should’
would be less polite and using ‘may’ would be flat-out rude. It’s an interesting question
what conversational factors are responsible for such apparent reversals of the modals’ felt
forces. Given our focus on the weak/strong necessity modal distinction I put the issue aside,
since the phenomenon generalizes to to intuitively “weak” uses of imperatives, as in permis-
sion/invitation uses such as (40) (von Fintel & Iatridou 2015), and intuitively “strong”
uses of possibility modals, as in (39c) and command uses such as (41).
(40) Here, have some of this cake!
(41) [Context: Celebrity to entourage:]
You may/can leave now.
5.3 Qualification: Endorsing and non-endorsing use
I have said that ‘(Must φ) ∧ ¬φ’ cannot be coherently accepted on any reading. This claim
needs to be qualified. Though there is robust data attesting to the general anomalousness
of deontic ‘(Must φ) ∧ ¬φ’ (n. 28), some speakers report being able to hear sincere uses as
consistent in certain contexts.34 However, a critical observation is that even speakers who
can hear examples such as (42) as consistent agree that it would be more natural to use a
strong necessity modal such as ‘have to’ or ‘be required to’, as in (43).
33Cf. “Bradshaw said, he must be taught to rest. Bradshaw said they must be separated. ‘Must,’ ‘must,’ why
‘must’? What power had Bradshaw over him? ‘What right has Bradshaw to say “must” to me?’ he demanded”
(Mrs Dalloway, Virginia Woolf). See also n. 36.
34I haven’t seen this judgment expressed in published work, though I’ve heard it voiced in personal conver-
sation. Thanks to Jan Dowell for discussion.
26
(42) I must go to confession; I’m a Catholic. But I’m not going to. I haven’t practiced for
years.
(43) I have to (/I’m required to) go to confession; I’m a Catholic. But I’m not going to. I
haven’t practiced for years.
Intuitively, in (43) it’s consistent for the speaker to dismiss going to confession because she
isn’t endorsing the norms which imply that she is obligated to do so. She is simply reporting
what these norms require.
This observation suggests that one can hear examples such as (42) as felicitous to the
extent that one accepts “objective” uses of ‘must’ in (roughly) the sense of Lyons (1977,
1995). Adapting Lyons’s terminology, say that a modal is used endorsingly in an utterance
of ‘MODAL φ’ if the utterance presents the speaker as endorsing/accepting the considera-
tions with respect to which the modal is interpreted; and say that the modal is used non-
endorsingly if it doesn’t. Among strong necessity modals, ‘be required to’ is typically used
non-endorsingly; ‘have to’ and ‘(have) got to’ are more flexible, with ‘have to’ tending more
toward the non-endorsing side of the spectrum and ‘(have) got to’ toward the endorsing
side; and ‘must’ is typically used endorsingly.35 It’s easier to hear sincere utterances with
(e.g.) ‘have to’/‘be required to’ as compatible with the speaker’s rejecting or being indifferent
about the considerations that would verify the modal claim:
(44) [Context: Some friends are deciding whether to go home or stay out late for a party.]
a. #You must get home by 11, but I don’t care whether you do.
b. #Bert must get home by 11. Aren’t his parents stupid? I would stay out if I were
him.
(45) a. You have to (/are required to) get home by 11, but I don’t care whether you do.
b. Bert has to (/is required to) get home by 11. Aren’t his parents stupid? I would
stay out if I were him.
When one wishes to describe relevant norms without necessarily expressing endorsement of
them, one typically uses (e.g.) ‘have to’ rather than ‘must’.
35These generalizations are supported by robust data in descriptive linguistics. In addition to Lyons 1977,
1995, see Leech 1971, 2003, Lakoff 1972a,b, Coates 1983, Perkins 1983, Palmer 1990, 2001, Myhill
1995, 1996, Myhill & Smith 1995, Verstraete 2001, Huddleston & Pullum 2002, Smith 2003, Leech
et al. 2009, Close & Aarts 2010, Goddard 2014. For critical discussion see Swanson 2012, 2016b, Silk
2015b, 2016a; see Silk 2016a, 2017a for formal implementations. The distinction between (what I’m call-
ing) endorsing/non-endorsing uses has been noted under various labels in diverse disciplines (e.g. Hare 1952,
von Wright 1963, Verstraete 2007, Silk 2016a). I adapt Lyons’s terminology since use of ‘subjective’ and
‘objective’ can be fraught. I use ‘endorsement’ as a cover term for acceptance attitudes of various kinds.
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So, the promised qualification is this: endorsing uses of ‘STRONG φ’ are incompatible
with a denial of ‘φ’. It’s only with endorsing uses of strong necessity modals that ⋂P(w)
must be included in the context set. What makes the claims about entailingness and perfor-
mativity particularly compelling in the case of ‘must’ (versus e.g. ‘have to’)— is that ‘must’
is typically used endorsingly.36 But to the extent to which one finds non-endorsing uses of
‘must’ acceptable, to that same extent one is predicted to find uses of deontic ‘Must φ’ to be
non-entailing and lack directive force.
What is distinctive about weak necessity modals is that even when they are used endors-
ingly, they are non-entailing and may lack imperative force. ‘Ought’ and ‘should’ are like
‘must’ in typically being used endorsingly (n. 35).37 Parallel to (44)–(45), the claims in (46)
with ‘ought’ would be more naturally expressed with e.g. ‘supposed to’, as in (47).
(46) a. #You ought to get home by 11, but I don’t care whether you do.
b. #Bert ought to get home by 11. Aren’t his parents stupid? I’d stay out if I were
him.
(47) a. You’re supposed to get home by 11, but I don’t care whether you do.
b. Bert is supposed to get home by 11. Aren’t his parents stupid? I’d stay out if I
were him.
Yet a characteristic use of ‘Ought φ’ is with an explicit or implicated denial of ‘φ’ (§4).
6 Negotiability and collective commitment
Along the way we noted various ways in which the approach to the weak/strong necessity
modal distinction in this paper differs from other approaches in the literature (§§2–5). For
instance, alternative approaches generally agree in treating uses of ‘Ought φ’ as predicating
a distinctive kind of necessity, namely weak necessity, of the prejacent φ at the actual (eval-
uation) world. Very roughly: On domain restriction accounts (Copley 2006, von Fintel &
Iatridou 2008, Swanson 2011, Rubinstein 2012, Charlow 2013), φ is a weak necessity
if φ is true throughout a certain set S of worlds, where S is a subdomain of the set of worlds
quantified over by ‘must’. On probabilistic/comparative possibility accounts (Finlay 2009,
2010, 2014, Lassiter 2011), φ is a weak necessity if φ is sufficiently likely/desirable, or more
likely/desirable than any relevant alternative to φ. Although Yalcin’s (2016) normality-based
36It isn’t implausible that the drastic decline in frequency of deontic ‘must’ is due in no small part to the
above features of its meaning and use (cf. Myhill 1995, 1996, Krug 2000, Smith 2003, Tagliamonte 2004,
Leech et al. 2009, Close & Aarts 2010, Goddard 2014).
37Hence why I framed the discussion primarily with these modals: doing so abstracts away from indepen-
dent issues concerning (non-)endorsingness.
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semantics denies that ‘ought’ and ‘must’ are logically related, ‘Ought φ’ is still interpreted by
evaluating the truth of φ throughout a set of minimal worlds relative to the actual world.
The approach in this paper rejects treating acceptance of ‘Ought φ’ in terms of φ being
a necessity, in any posited sense of necessity, at every candidate for the actual world. The
apparent “weakness” of (so-called) weak necessity modals is diagnosed instead in terms of
a failure to presuppose that the relevant worlds at which the prejacent is a necessity are in
the context set (§4). For example, the semantics in Definition 4 adds a layer of modality,
predicating the ordinary necessity claim [λw.⋂P(w) ⊆ JφKc] of every world in a certain set
of possibly counterfactual worlds. The proposed “modal-past approach” (even if not imple-
mented in precisely this way) captures contrasting discourse properties of ‘ought’ and ‘must’
such as differences in conversational force and relations to standing contextual assumptions;
it captures logical properties such as differences in entailingness and the lack of entailments
between ‘ought’ and ‘must’/‘may’; it captures relations between weak necessity modals and
broader modal-past phenomena; and it generalizes across flavors of modality.
There are insights from previous accounts which are preserved in the account developed
here. The semantics in §4 allow for connections between weak necessity modals and com-
mon ground assumptions (n. 4); mood, counterfactuality, and conditionality (nn. 15, 20, 23);
and notions of comparison (n. 24), normality (Makinson 1993, Frank 1996, Yalcin 2016),
and probability (though not unconditional probability; n. 27). Previous accounts are often
developed with an eye toward one or few of these issues to the exclusion of others. Although
we haven’t examined each of the connections in equal depth, I hope the discussion has illus-
trated the fruitfulness of a modal-past approach and its potential for systematizing diverse
linguistic phenomena.
Before concluding Iwould like to compare in a bitmore detail the account of theweak/strong
necessity modal distinction in this paper with the particular domain restriction account in
Rubinstein 2012, since it constitutes the most extensively developed alternative from the
literature (see also Rubinstein 2014, Portner & Rubinstein 2012, 2016). We have already
observed general points of disagreement between the modal-past approach and domain re-
striction accounts (above, also §§3,5). Here I focus on the distinctive feature of Rubinstein’s
account: the appeal to collective commitment to a body of “priorities” (norms, goals, ideals).38
Rubinstein’s main innovation is to supplement von Fintel & Iatridou’s domain restriction
semantics with a substantive account of the primary vs. secondary ordering source distinc-
tion (§4): whatmakes a primary ordering source “primary” is that it includes premises which
38Rubinstein doesn’t examine epistemic modals. I leave open how the account would be extended to epis-
temic readings. As discussed previously, there will be general worries regarding the lack of entailments between
epistemic ‘ought’ and ‘may/‘must’, and the fact that epistemic ‘ought’ doesn’t in general quantify over a set of
worlds that are regarded as epistemically possible (§§4–5). See Silk 2013a for critical discussion of Portner &
Rubinstein’s (2012) appeal to collective commitment in an account of mood selection.
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the interlocutors are presupposed to be collectively committed to; what makes a secondary or-
dering source “secondary” is that it includes premises which the interlocutors are presup-
posed not to be collectively committed to. ‘Must’ is interpreted only with respect to primary
premises; ‘ought’ is logically weaker in being interpreted with respect to these premises as
well as secondary premises which are presupposed not to be collectively endorsed:
[S]trong necessity modals are only sensitive to prioritizing premises that the
conversational participants are presupposed to be collectively committed to…
[I]f any participant in the conversation were given the chance to defend these
priorities, it is assumed in the context of the conversation that they would do so.
Weak necessitymodals take into account all these premises plus somemore. For
these additional premises, lack of collective commitment is presupposed… [A]
speaker uses a weak modal when he or she believes (perhaps mistakenly) that
the secondary priorities it depends on are still up for discussion. (Rubinstein
2012: 51–52)
In (48) although the speaker is committed to a priority favoring cost-effectiveness, it isn’t pre-
supposed that Alice is committed to it (cf. Rubinstein 2012: 55–60). This lack of collective
commitment is what calls for using ‘ought’, on Rubinstein’s view.
(48) [Context: Alice is considering whether to take the subway or a cab to a concert. The
subway is cheaper; the cab is quicker. You say:]
You ought to (/should, /?have to, /?must) take the subway.
For clarity use ‘commitmentR’ for the notion of commitment in Rubinstein’s analyses.
Rubinstein is explicit in identifying commitmentR to a priority p with endorsing that p is
desirable (e.g. 2012: 78; also Portner & Rubinstein 2012: 471, 475, 477–481). What deter-
mines whether p is a “primary” or “secondary” priority is the interlocutors’ mutual presup-
positions about the desirability of p. Yet, as we have seen, the weak/strong necessity modal
distinction crosscuts the distinction between necessity modals that express endorsement in
this sense and those that don’t, and hence crosscuts the distinction between necessity modals
that express collective commitmentR and those that express a lack of commitmentR.
§5 delineated two dimensions along which modals can differ: strength, and tendencies
for (non-)endorsing use, i.e. the extent to which uses of ‘MODAL φ’ convey the speaker’s
endorsement of the considerations that would verify the modal claim. Delineating these di-
mensions brings out problems with diagnosing the weak/strong necessity modal distinction
in terms of collective commitmentR. First, there are uses of weak necessity modals express-
ing collective endorsement of the relevant priority. In (49) we are both publicly committedR
to the value of family; my helping my mother is “publicly endorsed as desirable” by every
conversational participant. Yet ‘ought’ is felicitous, indeed preferred.
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(49) Me: Family is very important. I think I would rather stay here.
You: I agree. You ought to tend to your mother.
Second, there are uses of strong necessity modals where the interlocutors expressly reject
commitmentsR to the relevant priorities, as in (43) and (45) (and possibly (42)). The lack of
endorsement can even be common ground:
(50) [Context: Our parents are asleep. We’ve settled on staying out to go to a party.]
You: When is curfew, again? We need to make sure that we tell Mom we got back
before then if she asks.
Me: We have to be home by 11. Aren’t her rules stupid? This party is going to be
great.
Counterexamples such as these aren’t atypical. Corpus studies uniformly attest to varia-
tion among modals in each class (weak/strong) vis-à-vis tendencies to express collective
commitmentR. Indeed collective commitmentR has been appealed to in distinguishing among
weak necessity modals, and among strong necessity modals.39 Summarizing his corpus anal-
yses of ‘ought’ and ‘should’ in contemporary American English, Myhill concludes, “using
ought suggests that people have the same feelings about the specific obligation in question
and there is agreement about it, while should does not suggest the same feelings or agreement”
(1997: 8). Far from being exceptional, expressing collective commitmentR with ‘ought’ is the
norm, as in the naturally occurring example in (51) (slightly modified).
(51) A: I won’t tell anyone… but the Dean, of course.
B: And Mrs. Reynolds.
A: Yes. She ought to know. (Myhill 1997: 10)
Conversely, though ‘must’ tends to express collective commitmentR, other strong necessity
modals, such as ‘(have) got to’, do not. ‘(Have) got to’ differs in being “associated with con-
flicts between the speaker and the listener” (Myhill 1996: 365), as in the naturally occurring
example in (52).
(52) Edie, you’ve got to stop bothering me when I’m working. (Myhill 1996: 369)
Collective commitmentR to the contents of premise setsmay affect the distribution ofmodals
in discourse, but it isn’t what explains the distinction between weak and strong necessity
modals.
39See e.g. Joos 1964, Myhill & Smith 1995, Myhill 1996, 1997, Verstraete 2001, Facchinetti et al.
2003, Leech et al. 2009, Close & Aarts 2010, Goddard 2014.
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A modal-past approach captures intuitions about negotiability and collective commit-
ment which may be motivating Rubinstein’s account. Strong necessity modals “presuppose
(collective) commitment” in the same boring sense as any other context-sensitive expression:
one commits to the value of the context-dependent item being as one’s utterance assumes,
and to the world being as one’s utterance says it is, given this assumed value. Such a commit-
ment is compatible with not endorsing-as-desirable the premises p ∈ P(w), for any w ∈ c. In
(50) we can accept that the house rules require us to be home by 11 while denying that those
rules are desirable or that they are to guide our plans. Conversely, uses of weak necessity
modals express “negotiability” in the sense that they don’t commit one to being in a world
where the relevant considerations verify the necessity of the prejacent. Lacking commitment
to the prejacent’s being necessary is compatible with (collectively) endorsing the considera-
tions encoded in the given premise frame or premises fromwhich the prejacent would follow.
In (5) we can endorse the value of family even if we prefer not to settle how it relates to other
potentially competing values.
7 Conclusion
This paper developed amodal-past approach to ‘ought’ and the distinction between so-called
weak necessity modals (‘ought’, ‘should’) and strong necessity modals (‘must’, ‘have to’).
There is nothing specially “strong” about the necessity expressed by strong necessity modals:
Strong necessity modals are given their ordinary semantics/pragmatics of necessity; uses of
‘Must φ’ predicate the (deontic/epistemic/etc.) necessity of the prejacent φ of every candi-
date for the actual world. The apparent “weakness” of weak necessity modals derives from
their bracketing whether the prejacent is necessary in the actual world: uses of ‘Ought φ’ fail
to presuppose that the topic worlds in which φ is necessary are included in the context set.
‘Ought φ’ can be accepted without needing to settle that the relevant considerations (norms,
goals, etc.) which actually apply verify the necessity of φ. This analysis carves out important
roles for weak necessitymodals in conversation and deliberation. As emphasized throughout
Gibbard’s (1990, 2003, 2012) developments of expressivism, ‘ought’ affords a means of co-
ordinating our conditional attitudes and plans. Weak necessity modals allow us to entertain
and plan for hypothetical continuations or minimal revisions of the current context; they af-
ford conventional devices for coordinating our norms, values, expectations, without having
to settle precisely how the relevant considerations apply and compare. The proposed account
systematizes a spectrum of semantic and pragmatic data— e.g., concerning the relative felic-
ity of weak and strong necessity modals, relations between uses of weak and strong necessity
modals and standing contextual assumptions, themorphosyntactic properties of expressions
of ought cross-linguistically, and contrasting logical and illocutionary properties of weak
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and strong necessity modals. The range of linguistic phenomena that are unified under and
explained by the account lend it a robust base of support.
The data considered here aren’t the only data to be explained by an overall theory of
weak and strong necessity modals. For instance, there are additional linguistic contrasts be-
tween the classes of weak and strong necessitymodals, such as in data with incomparabilities,
comparatives, quantifiers, conditionals, modifiers, and neg-raising.40Second, we briefly ex-
amined one further dimension of difference amongmodals in tendencies for endorsing/non-
endorsing use. It’s worth investigating interactions between weak/strong necessity modals
andother suchdifferences inmodalmeanings, e.g. with implicatures (cf. Verstraete 2005a).
Third, although I argued against treating ‘ought’ and ‘must’/‘may’ as ordered by logical or
quantificational strength, more thorough comparisons of inference patterns with different
types of readings are needed. Fourth, our discussion highlighted interactions between weak
and strong necessity modals and general issues such as context-sensitivity, counterfactual-
ity, attitude expression, and performativity. These interactions afford rich avenues for future
research. Further investigation of such issues would be helpful in adjudicating among alter-
native formal implementations of a modal-past approach.
In closing I would like to raise two potential avenues for future work, one more narrowly
linguistic, one more philosophical.
7.1 Counterfactuality?
In §4we noted that it’s common inmany languages to express a notion of ought by using the
form of a strong necessity modal used in counterfactuals. Such languages use the same string
to express ought and counterfactual necessity (would have to). Other things equal, it
would seem preferable to take the surface forms at face value. Yet as von Fintel & Iatridou
(2008: 128–131) observe, ‘ought’ cannot generally be replaced by ‘would have to’:
(53) a. I ought to help the poor, but I don’t have to.
b. ?I would have to help the poor, but I don’t have to.
Open questions include (i) how non-lexicalized expressions of ought are diachronically re-
lated to the dedicated lexical items, (ii) how interpretations of certain uses of STRONG+CF
might become conventionalized into expressions of ought, (iii) how counterfactual inter-
pretations of STRONG+CF are synchronically related tomeanings of grammaticalized forms
like ‘ought’, and (iv) how meanings of the grammaticalized forms compare across languages.
The modal-past analysis in Definition 4 avoids giving ‘Ought φ’ the semantics of an implicit
counterfactual necessity claim and conflating ‘ought’ with ‘would have to’: the necessity of
40See e.g. Lassiter 2011, 2012, Swanson2011, Charlow2013, Iatridou&Zeijlstra2013, Silk 2013b,d,
2015b, 2016b, Rubinstein 2012, 2014, Portner & Rubinstein 2016.
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φ isn’t evaluated at the closest ψ-worlds, for any implicit condition ψ, but at the relevant
minimal/“preferred” (desirable, normal, etc.) worlds, determined by h. Although the focus
of this paper has been on lexicalized English weak necessity modals, it’s worth considering
how such an interpretation might become associated with certain uses of STRONG+CF in
other languages. Channeling my inner Gibbard, “What I can suggest will have to be quite
speculative, but the speculations, I hope, may prompt more solid investigation” (1990: 61).
Using a clause that lacks the standard indicative presupposition places a burden on the
interpreter’s task of inferring which possibilities are being talked about. A condition spec-
ifying which possibilities are relevant typically must be salient, either implicitly or in the
linguistic context (cf. Schueler 2011):
(54) [Context: We’re trying out guitars in a music store. Looking at an expensive vintage
Les Paul, I say:]
(If I bought it,) my wife would kill me.
So, if no condition is retrievable, using ‘would have to’ is anomalous:
(55) (If I wanted to buy it,) I would have to check with my wife first.
(56) [Context:We’re strangers in a hotel lobby. I notice you fumblingwith your bags. I say:]
?Here, I would have to help you.
Uses of ‘ought’ lack this salience/retrievability requirement:
(57) [Context: Same as (56)]
Here, I ought to help you.
A hypothesis, then, is that distinctive discourse effects of weak necessity modals are products
of using an expression that is neither marked as being about the context set (as via indicative
mood) nor indicated as being about some other topical possibility (via an implicit/explicit
condition).
Suppose we’re inquiring about the necessity of φ. Uttering ‘STRONG φ’ requires settling
which considerations apply and aren’t defeated. We might not be prepared to restrict the
future course of the conversation in this way. Nevertheless each of us takes some ways of
extending the conversation and addressing the question under discussion to be more likely
or better than others. Using the modal-past form allows us to consider the necessity of φ
as holding, not necessarily in the current context, as with a strong necessity modal, but in
a preferred (likely/normal/desirable) continuation or minimal revision of the current con-
text, whatever that might turn out to be (§§2–3). This predicts that one’s judgments about
replacing ‘would have to’ with ‘ought’ should improve to the extent that the antecedent for
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‘would have to’ describes what one regards as “preferred” conditions relevant for evaluating
questions about the necessity of φ. Indeed the discourse effects of ‘would have to’ and ‘ought’
are strikingly closer in (59) than in (58).
(58) a. (If I was a mobster, which I’m not,) I would have to kill you.
b. ?I ought to kill you.
(59) [Context: Alice is considering with her mother whether to take the A- or C-train.
The A is quicker; the C is safer. Her mother says:]
a. If safety was most important, you would have to take the C-train. In fact, safety
is more important, as we can agree. So you must/have to take the C.
b. You ought to take the C-train. In fact, safety is most important, as we can agree.
So you must/have to take the C.
As often occurs in grammaticalization and pragmaticalization, the original (counterfactual)
meaning may be semantically bleached, and the reinterpreted (weakness) meaning becomes
more abstract; the attitude expressed (here, about the necessity claim) can thus appear vague
or nonspecific.41 Such an interpretation is essentially what is delivered by the lexically un-
specified generalized notion of minimality associated with h in Definition 4.42 This gram-
maticalization path would predict the observed variations in how ought is expressed cross-
41SeeHorn 1984, Heine et al. 1991, Lehmann 1995, Hopper&Traugott 2003, Narrog&Heine 2011;
and Traugott 1995, 2003, Diewald 2011; Davis & Gutzmann 2015.
42Themain-text hypothesis approaches weakness uses of STRONG+CF on the model of a conditional con-
sequent (one lacking a particular retrievable antecedent). An alternative would be to think of the uses on the
model of the antecedent. Interestingly, there is a precedent for associating an interpretation like the one given
to h with a certain type of ‘if ’-clause. Grosz 2012 argues that optatives/exclamatives should be treated on the
model of non-logical ‘if ’-clauses under a covert exclamation operator EX (“non-logical” because the embedded
clause provides the subject matter of the attitude).
(i) Oh, that it would snow!
a. EX [it snows]
b. ≈It would be good if it snowed.
(ii) Oh, that it snowed!
a. EX [it snowed]
b. ≈It’s surprising that it snowed.
Grosz’s EX operator is essentially a scalar analogue of h, also generalized to express a lexically unspecified
attitude toward the embedded proposition. A Grosz-style scalar version of Definition 4— that ‘Ought φ’ is
true iff the proposition that φ is necessary is at least as h-“preferred” (desirable/normal/etc.) as a contextually
relevant standard/threshold—might help capture connections between weak necessity modals and gradabil-
ity/comparatives (Finlay 2014, Rubinstein 2014, Portner & Rubinstein 2016). Cross-linguistic compar-
isons among morphological/lexical expressions of ought, non-logical ‘if ’-clauses, and optatives/exclamatives
may provide fruitful avenues to explore.
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linguistically— i.e. with some languages using only a conventionalized weakness interpreta-
tion of STRONG+CF (French); some languages using only a grammaticalized form (English);
and some languages using both (German).
It’s important to remember that everyoneneeds an account of howweakness/tentativeness
interpretations of past forms are derived across modals (e.g. (17)–(19)), and how weakness
interpretations versus implicit-counterfactual interpretations of past forms are determined
across contexts (see also n. 14). To my knowledge, no such derivation has been given (or,
in the case of ought-interpretations of STRONG+CF in other languages, even attempted).
The above hypothesis provides a potential basis for weakness (tentativeness, politeness) ef-
fects associated with modal-past forms generally. Thorough synchronic/diachronic cross-
linguistic work on the interpretation of modal-past forms, and how ought-interpretations
of STRONG+CF become conventionalized and in some cases grammaticalized, is called for.
7.2 Philosophical therapy?
I would be remiss if I concluded without at least asking how, if at all, our linguistic in-
quiry might inform theorizing about a “primitive concept ought” (Gibbard 2012: 204).
How might investigating a word ‘ought’ teach us something about “concepts fraught with” a
“primitive ought” (Gibbard 2003: x, 2012: 14)?
Consider our discussion of the practicality of deontic ‘ought’ and ‘must’ judgments. It’s
common in discourse and deliberation to investigate what we are actually required to do.
We wish to guide our planning and influence one another’s behavior in light of the norms we
accept. An endorsing strong necessity modal like ‘must’ is well-suited to the task. However,
using ‘must’ is often awkward. Wemay want to talk about obligations which held in the past,
or whichmay go unfulfilled or be overridden in the future. Or wemay want to communicate
information about a body of norms without necessarily registering commitment to them or
enjoining others to share in such commitment. A modal like ‘ought’ or ‘be required to’ can
thus bemore suitable. There is a range of expressive resources at our disposal for coordinating
our actions and attitudes. This is for the better given the variety of our purposes. But it also
raises a philosophical risk. Bracketing differences among necessity modals might turn out to
be harmless for the purposes of (meta)normative inquiry. But it might not.
A core innovation in Gibbard’s expressivism is the thesis of normative concepts as essen-
tially plan-laden:
(60) To believe that one ought to do X is to plan to do X.
Thinking what I ought to do is thinking what to do…
Ought claims… are claims about what to do. (Gibbard 2012: 204; 2003: ix–x, 10)
Generalizing:
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The clear distinctive feature of normative concepts, I now think, lies in their
conceptual ties. Oughts of action tie in conceptually with acting. (Gibbard
2011: 36)
Many take it as obvious that some form of internalism is true. After all, normative judgments
are constitutive of deliberation, and deliberation is essentially practical; its aim is action. But
many find clear counterexamples. What about the psychopath, or someone who is tired or
depressed (such as perhaps the poor reader who has made it to this point in the paper)?
Attending to the dimensions of difference among necessity modals examined in this pa-
per may shed light on conflicting intuitions about the ostensible “plan-ladenness” of “con-
cepts fraught with ought.” Gibbard hedges: the concepts “fraught with ought” are so-fraught
“not for every sense of the term [‘ought’],” but for the “crucial sense” explained by the pattern
in (60) (2003: x). It’s revealing that althoughGibbard couches the thesis about the practicality
of the normative using ‘ought’, he pumps the intuition using ‘must’:
…Oughts of action tie in conceptually with acting. Take, for example, the belief
that the building is on fire and the one and only way to keep from being burned
to a crisp is to leave forthwith. If that’s the case, we’d better leave forthwith,
but it isn’t strictly incoherent, conceptually, to have this belief and not to leave.
Contrast this with the normative belief that one must leave forthwith. It is, I
maintain, conceptually incoherent to hold this belief and not leave, if one can.
(Gibbard 2011: 36)
As we’ve seen, it’s hard to hear a sincere utterance of ‘Must φ’ as consistent with the speaker’s
being indifferent about whether φ; yet such judgments aren’t nearly as anomalous when ex-
pressed with weak necessity modals or (weak/strong) necessity modals that are more natu-
rally used non-endorsingly (§§4–6).
(61) #Imust (/I’ve got to) get home by 10, but forget that; I’m not going to.
(62) I {ought to, should, am supposed to, have to} get home by 10, but forget that; I’m not
going to.
We should be wary of general claims about normative language and judgment. A thesis of the
form in (60) may seem compelling when considering examples using terms that are paradig-
matically entailing and endorsing. But whenwe consider cases using other terms, counterex-
amples can appear in the offing. A “primitive concept ought” may be expressed by ‘ought’
less often than initially supposed.
The skeptically inclined might be apt to wonder what is at-issue in debates such as about
judgment internalism— that is, if not linguistic issues about directive/entailing/endorsing
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uses of language, or empirical psychological issues about conditions under which different
attitudes and judgments guide and motivate us. One might wonder how probative it is to
couch metaethical inquiry in terms of a class of “normative” language/concepts/judgments
at all. More fruitful, perhaps, to leave talk of the “normative” to the side, and ask directly
about motivational states of mind and directive uses of language, and what type of person
one wants to be and how to live.43
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